Global launch supply — not satellite manufacturing, not spectrum — is the binding constraint on every non-SpaceX constellation through ~2028, on two distinct axes: (1) cadence — SpaceX's own Starlink/ orbital-compute demand crowds out external customers on Falcon 9; and (2) fairing volume — some payload classes (AST SpaceMobile's BlueBirds) don't stack efficiently inside F9's fairing.
Axis (1) has a primary-source admission from Amazon Leo/Kuiper's own FCC milestone filing and a hard demand signal: SEOPS' Waymaker rideshare manifest sold out within a month, before SpaceX froze new Transporter/Bandwagon bookings past late 2028 entirely. Axis (2) is substitutable, not absolute — AST re-routed its manifest onto F9 at reduced density rather than being blocked outright, at a SEC-quantified 3-6 month schedule cost. No alternative vehicle yet offers comparable cadence at comparable $/kg on either axis: every US NSSL-certified vehicle besides Falcon 9 has been simultaneously non-operational for months, Rocket Lab, Firefly, and China's own launch base each add further schedule-risk or reliability weakness, and the government funding meant to widen the pool (Jul 17 NSSL Lane 1 ceiling tripling) hasn't yet converted into non-SpaceX task-order revenue — two of six on-ramped providers can't bid until each's own first launch.
(a) two consecutive quarters where a non-SpaceX provider flies >=1 dedicated LEO-constellation mission per month at a disclosed price within 2x of Falcon 9 rideshare rates
no non-SpaceX constellation-launch data point exists yet (Neutron, New Glenn, Vulcan remain pre-flight-or-grounded), and the sole NSSL Lane 1 scoreboard entry to date (Jul 29-30, 100% SpaceX) remains unjoined by a second tranche
| Month | Falcon 9 | Vulcan + New Glenn | Other US | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-01 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 14 |
| 2025-02 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 14 |
| 2025-03 | 11 | 0 | 3 | 14 |
| 2025-04 | 14 | 0 | 3 | 17 |
| 2025-05 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 17 |
| 2025-06 | 15 | 0 | 5 | 20 |
| 2025-07 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| 2025-08 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 17 |
| 2025-09 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 17 |
| 2025-10 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 16 |
| 2025-11 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 17 |
| 2025-12 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 17 |
| 2026-01 | 13 | 0 | 2 | 15 |
| 2026-02 | 12 | 1 | 0 | 13 |
| 2026-03 | 15 | 0 | 4 | 19 |
| 2026-04 | 12 | 1 | 4 | 17 |
| 2026-05 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 13 |
| 2026-06 | 14 | 0 | 2 | 16 |
| 2026-07 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 14 |
| 2026-08 * | 13 | 0 | 2 | 15 |
| Total | 267 | 5 | 43 | 315 |
The Aug 19 Cape Canaveral Starlink launch was SpaceX's last on Falcon 9 there — every future Florida Starlink mission moves to Starship — timed with a $100bn "Starbase Louisiana" megasite announcement (first launch NET 2029). Voluntary, not forced: self-derived F9 Starlink cadence ticked up to ~9.76/month through Aug 25, reversing the deceleration tracked since early July — the open question is whether Starship's own cadence can absorb the volume on schedule.
ESA confirmed Ariane 6's Block 3 evolution — including the ICARUS upper stage — is shelved, narrowing Europe's IRIS²-primary launcher's ceiling. LandSpace's Zhuque-3 Y2 achieved China's first land-based booster recovery, but the booster toppled and was damaged hours later — a landing, not yet a reflight. Guowang and Qianfan unmoved since Aug 18.
New Glenn, Vulcan, Neutron, Firefly, and Stoke show no change since Aug 18 (negative check). Portal Space Systems bought a dedicated Falcon 9 to resell as rideshare — a second SEOPS-style workaround.
meoSphere's 2029 first-launch commitment sits in the projected peak-contention window. Threads: "O3b mPOWER sovereign pipeline", "Non-Western sovereign constellations", "Chinese BRI Digital Silk Road".
SES already follows this dossier's standing advice not to model New Glenn as a diversification option — meoSphere flies exclusively on Falcon 9 (K2 Space's Mar 30 pathfinder), sheltering it from New Glenn's unreliability but leaving it fully inside the same F9-cadence contention this dossier's central thesis treats as the primary axis. SES's own CEO confirmed this from the demand side on the Jul 30 H1 call: continued access is a function of SES's balance sheet, not assured supply.
Capacity is tightening on meoSphere's timeline, but not uniformly: the rideshare freeze is a direct constraint, while Telesat's confirmed dedicated F9 sale outside it is a template worth testing, not assumed automatic; AST's SEC-quantified 3-6 month schedule-cost precedent stays the cautionary case for an unplanned slip.
The FCC's Amazon Leo order (DA 26-553) remains a live precedent SES should study — see its mechanics; its penalties are self-executing, so a fresh order's absence is the expected baseline, not lapsing enforcement.
The clearest leading indicator: Vulcan and New Glenn stay grounded, leaving Falcon 9 the only currently-flying NSSL-certified vehicle, with Neutron, Firefly and Stoke all still pre-flight — no non-SpaceX vehicle is a credible near-term meoSphere alternative today.
Watch: any K2/SES procurement disclosure naming a non-F9 vehicle or dedicated-buy carve-out; New Glenn/Vulcan RTF; Neutron's flight against its 2027-shaded window; NSSL Lane 1 distribution once a challenger clears its first-flight gate; and SpaceX's Cape Canaveral F9-to-Starship transition as a template for whether the same swap reaches Vandenberg, where meoSphere's own manifest sits.
Trust planet4589 (McDowell) over Chinese official figures for satellite counts and F9 cadence — self-derived mirror arithmetic has been cross-checked across seven passes (07-19 through 08-25). First genuine boundary discrepancy this run (08-25): the Aug 18 F9-total re-derives to 95, not 96 — a parsing edge case (the Starlink-specific count matches exactly), flagged in TRACKED SERIES for hand-verification rather than silently overwritten. Trust disclosed 8-K/10-Q/S-1 language and unprompted CEO Q&A over analyst estimates or scripted remarks — Rocket Lab's and Firefly's CEOs independently using near-identical "most constrained ever" language, unprompted, four days apart (08-18), is that discipline paying off; FCC orders read in full via WebFetch sit at the same tier. Upgrade confidence in TMFAssociates (Farrar) on launch-vehicle calls specifically: his pre-explosion New Glenn skepticism (Mar 25) was vindicated and understated the case (07-13); his Aug 10 counter-argument (Starlink may be terminal-manufacturing- and demand-constrained, not launch-constrained) was engaged directly, not filtered through confirmation bias (see the engagement). Standing blind-spot discipline (08-07): a company naming a vehicle as a hedge is evidence of intent, not of that vehicle's flight status — check the vehicle's own record every time. Remaining blind spot: no independent $/kg data point yet (open question #1). Pipeline caveat: read x-tmfassociates.json, not just the RSS feed, for Farrar's TIER-A calls — his July 6 X-only 2028-slip forecast went uncaptured for two weeks when only the blog feed was checked.
New this run (08-25): a vehicle operator confirming a supply move is not the same evidence tier as the move happening — SpaceX's Cape Canaveral F9-to-Starship transition is a company statement about future behavior (backed by ending an actual, dated F9 run), not yet a demonstrated Starship cadence; treated as a strong STATE OF PLAY signal, but Open Question 13 is where the outcome belongs until Starship delivers. Applied the same discipline to LandSpace's booster recovery: a landing is a capability, a reflight is a cost input, and this pass caught the gap within days rather than carrying the landing forward as an unqualified milestone.
Earlier lessons, compressed: the 08-18 pass found the NSSL Lane 1 pool was stated as "widened to six" for three passes without checking whether that implicitly excluded an already-on-ramped incumbent (Blue Origin) — re-verify a stated count against its origin, not just the most recent announcement. The 08-12 pass established that a stock's reaction to a specific disclosed sentence (RKLB falling on Neutron "narrowing" language despite record revenue) is sharper than averaging a filing's overall reception — read market reaction at sentence grain, not filing grain — and to re-read a cited source's own supporting detail, not just its headline figure, on any repeat citation (the Rocket Lab/Stoke eligibility gap was sitting in coverage already cited for its ceiling-tripling headline).
What is the real $/kg on recent dedicated LEO-constellation contracts? No hard figure found; Firefly's rising-ASP guidance is qualitative pricing-power evidence.
Resolves whena disclosed launch contract value with mass manifest.
Will Blue Origin return New Glenn to flight by end of 2026, or slip further? Unmoved since Aug 7: RTF still only "before end of year".
Resolves whenthe Stennis GS2 hotfire outcome, retrofit-hardware readiness, a revised RTF date.
Does Viasat secure an alternative bus-and-launch partner for Equatys after Rocket Lab's defection to Iridium? Negative check: Viasat's Aug 4 call gave no bus/launch decision.
Resolves whenViasat 8-K/investor disclosure — cross-ref industry-consolidation.
Does the DA 26-553 milestone-waiver precedent get cited in any other NGSO operator's FCC filing (SES/O3b mPOWER included)? No citation found.
Resolves whenFCC ECFS filings referencing DA 26-553.
Does AST's "early 2027" target hold, or does Farrar's 2028 call prove right? AST needs 9 more launches, now names Vulcan as an active hedge.
Resolves whenBlueBirds 14-16 cadence; any launch-M&A filing; guidance revision.
Does the tripled NSSL Lane 1 pipeline flow to non-SpaceX, or does SpaceX keep winning? Still 100% since Jul 17 (one tranche); the pool needed a provider-count correction.
Resolves whenfurther task-order announcements by provider vs. RTF/first-flight status.
Does SpaceX's rideshare-freeze past late 2028 hold, or relax at scale? Telesat's dedicated F9 inside the frozen window sharpens the question to whether that carve-out generalizes.
Resolves whenanother operator securing a dedicated buy past 2028; a SpaceX statement narrowing the freeze.
Will Vulcan return to flight before or after New Glenn, given the shared BE-4 retrofit? Unmoved since Aug 7.
Resolves whenULA's own RTF date; first Vulcan flight since Feb 12.
What explains Qianfan/Spacesail's cadence pause since Jul 5, now 6+ weeks? Genuinely unresolved despite the LM-7A investigation resolving the opposite way.
Resolves whena CASC/China SatNet schedule statement, or a resumed launch with a stated cause.
Does Starship's Cape Canaveral cadence catch up to the Starlink volume F9 is withdrawing from, or does a self-inflicted gap open? SpaceX confirmed the Aug 19 launch was the last F9 Starlink there; Starship has flown only one suborbital deployment to date.
Resolves whenStarship Flight 14's outcome; any disclosed Cape Starlink rate post-transition.
Does LandSpace reflight Zhuque-3's booster within its stated six-month target despite the toppling damage?
Resolves whena LandSpace statement on repair status or a revised reflight date.
Does Ariane 6's Block 3/ICARUS shelving change any disclosed IRIS²/ SpaceRISE payload-mass or performance assumption? No cross-reference found.
Resolves whenan ESA/SpaceRISE/IRIS²-prime disclosure citing Ariane 6's confirmed ceiling — cross-ref IRIS²/SpaceRISE.
Complete append-only series — 126 readings, 21 Jan 2026 → 20 Aug 2026. Rows never change once added; the time series is the evidence base. Each row number is a permanent link — click it to copy a link straight to that reading.
| # | Date | Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2026-06-24 | F9 launches YTD (total / Starlink) | 74 / 59 | brief 2026-06-27, planet4589 |
| 2 | 2026-06-24 | F9 Starlink cadence | ~7/month | brief 2026-06-27 |
| 3 | 2026-06-05 | Qianfan cumulative sats | ~200 | brief 2026-07-04, planet4589 cross-check |
| 4 | 2026-06-17 | Guowang cumulative sats | ~177 | brief 2026-06-26 (LM-12 Y7, group 22) |
| 5 | 2026-06-29 | Rocket Lab–Iridium EV | $8.0B | brief 2026-06-30 (8-K) |
| 6 | 2026-07-02 | F9 launches YTD (total / Starlink), self-derived | 76 / 61 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (distinct-mission count, Jan 1–Jul 2) |
| 7 | 2026-07-02 | F9 Starlink cadence, Jan 1–Jul 2 run rate | ~10.1/month | derived: 61 missions / 6.01 months, planet4589 mirror |
| 8 | 2026 (Jan 1–Jul 2) | Dedicated rideshare (Transporter/Bandwagon) F9 missions | 1 (Mar 30) vs. 6 in all of 2025 | planet4589 mirror, self-tabulated |
| 9 | 2026-03-25 (pub) | AST SpaceMobile New-Glenn reliance (fairing-stacking driven) | "9 of its first 12 launches" per Farrar | tmfassociates.com, "Jay Monroe finally wins his bet on Globalstar" |
| 10 | 2026-04-19 | First AST BlueBird on New Glenn | NG3/SM007 | planet4589 mirror |
| 11 | ~2026-06-01 | New Glenn LC-36 pad explosion (approx.) | pad destroyed | SpaceNews Jul 1 ("a month after"), brief 2026-07-01 |
| 12 | 2026-06-30 (pub) | Blue Origin LC-36 rebuild approach | hybrid horizontal/vertical integration, not pre-explosion design | brief 2026-07-01 |
| 13 | 2026-07-01 (pub) | New Glenn return-to-flight target | "by the end of the year" | SpaceNews mirror |
| 14 | 2026-07-02 | Final Atlas V flight (Kuiper LA08 batch) | Atlas V retired from Kuiper manifest | SpaceNews mirror ("Final Atlas 5 Amazon Leo mission launches") |
| 15 | 2026 (Feb–Jun) | Ariane 6 Kuiper batch cadence | 3 flights: Feb 12, Apr 30, Jun 17 (~1/10wk) | planet4589 mirror |
| 16 | 2026-07-04 (pub) | GAO: Space Force satellite/launch portfolio risk (costs, digital-engineering gaps, workforce) | flagged, no dollar figure given | SpaceNews mirror ("GAO flags satellite costs, launch risks") |
| 17 | 2026-04-19 | AST BlueBird 7 (NG3/SM007) outcome | LOST — 2nd-stage (BE-3U) thrust shortfall on 2nd burn, off-nominal low orbit, non-operational, insurance claim filed | WebSearch: SatNews Apr 23, AST businesswire PR Apr 19, Aviation Week; FAA declared "mishap," New Glenn grounded pending investigation from this date |
| 18 | 2026-05-28 | New Glenn LC-36 explosion — confirmed date/cause | hotfire/static-fire test ahead of NG-4 (49 Amazon Leo sats planned, none aboard/lost); vehicle destroyed, lightning tower + transporter-erector lost, tank farm/water tower only limited damage | Spaceflight Now (Jun 30, citing CEO Dave Limp); corrects prior "~2026-06-01 (approx.)" row above |
| 19 | 2026-06-06 (approx.) | LC-36 wreckage recovery complete | 9 days start-to-finish, debris cleared | Spaceflight Now Jun 30 (Limp) |
| 20 | 2026-07-01 (as of) | LC-36 recovery phase status | Phase 1 (site security) + Phase 2 (recovery/debris removal) complete; Phase 3 (CONOPS redesign + major repairs) in progress; Phases 4 (systems integration), 5 (flight readiness) not started | WebSearch: NASASpaceFlight "Blue Origin accelerates LC-36 recovery via hybrid plan" (Jul), corroborated by Spaceflight Now Jun 30 |
| 21 | 2026-06-17 | AST BlueBirds 8-10 launch | 3 sats/F9 fairing, confirmed flown | brief 2026-07-09/07-10; WebSearch corroboration |
| 22 | 2026-07-01 (pub) | AST BlueBirds 11-13 status | assembly complete, targeting F9 launch H1 August | SatNews Jul 1, brief 2026-07-12 |
| 23 | 2026 (full year target) | AST BlueBirds in orbit by end-2026 | 45-60 target, ~6/month manufacturing capacity | WebSearch (SatNews/Fierce Network cross-corroborated) |
| 24 | 2026-07-11 | F9 launches YTD (total/Starlink), self-derived | 80 / 64 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (distinct-mission count, Jan 1-Jul 11) |
| 25 | 2026-07-11 | F9 Starlink cadence, Jan 1-Jul 11 run rate | ~10.2/month | derived: 64 missions / 6.29 months, planet4589 mirror |
| 26 | 2026-07-07 | Transporter-17 (2nd 2026 dedicated rideshare) | flew, ending 99-day gap since Mar 30 | planet4589 mirror, self-tabulated |
| 27 | 2026-01-21 | Rocket Lab Neutron 1st-stage tank rupture | hydrostatic pressure test failure, Middle River MD; manufacturing defect in hand-laid tank | WebSearch: NASASpaceFlight "Rocket Lab sees Electron gains, Neutron delays in first half of 2026" (Jul 8) |
| 28 | 2026 (as of Jul 8 pub) | Neutron debut target | NET Q4 2026 (2nd delay in ~1yr: end-2025 -> Q1 2026 -> Q4 2026) | NASASpaceFlight Jul 8 |
| 29 | 2026-05 (pub) | Rocket Lab largest-ever contract | 5 Neutron + 3 Electron, 2026-2029, standard ASP, no discount, confidential customer | NASASpaceFlight Jul 8 |
| 30 | 2026-Q1 (pub) | Rocket Lab combined Electron/Neutron backlog | $2.2B; Q1 revenue $200.3M (+63.5% YoY); $2B+ liquidity | NASASpaceFlight Jul 8 (Rocket Lab Q1 earnings call, CFO Adam Spice) |
| 31 | 2026-01-30 (filed) | Amazon Leo/Kuiper FCC milestone-waiver application | 180 sats launched at filing; projected ~700 by Jul 30, 2026 (21% of 3,232); cites launch-provider delays/shortages as primary cause | PRIMARYFCC DA 26-553 (WebFetch, primary source) |
| 32 | 2026-06-05 | FCC Space Bureau order on Amazon Leo milestone (DA 26-553) | conditioned waiver granted; no cap at Jul 30 deadline; post-deadline sats lose spectrum priority 15-20mo; surety bond still forfeit if 50% missed; SpaceX's junior-processing-round demotion request rejected | PRIMARYFCC DA 26-553 (WebFetch, primary source, Chief Space Bureau Jay Schwarz) |
| 33 | 2026 (cumulative, per filing) | Amazon Leo Falcon 9 launches purchased from SpaceX | 13 total (3 disclosed 2023, 10 more disclosed in Jan 30, 2026 FCC filing) | WebSearch (SpaceNews "Amazon buys 10 more Falcon 9 launches"); FCC DA 26-553 |
| 34 | 2026-07-02 (released) | GAO-26-107564 Space Force acquisition portfolio report | $11.4B cumulative cost overruns, 32% aggregate cost escalation across 13 procurements incl. national-security launch and SDA pLEO; flags "persistent delays in industrial heavy-lift launch delivery schedules" | WebSearch (SatNews Jul 4, SpaceNews Jul 4); resolves prior row's "no dollar figure given" |
| 35 | 2026-07-08/09 (pub) | BOEM offshore launch-site RFI | Dept. of Interior RFI on repurposing offshore oil/gas platforms for launch/reentry/recovery, citing "growing congestion at the nation's launch pads"; comments due Aug 7, 2026; stems from Dec 2025 executive order | sources/latest/spacenews.rss, payloadspace.rss, ars-science.rss (Jul 9-10) |
| 36 | 2026-07-15 (filed) | AST SpaceMobile 8-K: commercial D2D service delay | end-2026 target slips 3-6 months to "early 2027," attributed by CSO Scott Wisniewski explicitly to Blue Origin New Glenn's Apr 19 + May 28 failures; company holds contracts with SpaceX/ULA Vulcan/India LVM3 as a multi-provider hedge | WebSearch (SpaceNews, Via Satellite, LightReading, SatNews cross-corroborated on AST's own 8-K language), 2026-07-19 sweep |
| 37 | 2026-07-06 | Tim Farrar (X/@TMFAssociates) forecasts AST commercial service could slip to 2028 | more pessimistic than AST's own "early 2027": cites unaccounted post-launch orbit-raising/unfurling/testing time and production delays; not captured by any daily brief 07-07 through 07-18 despite the account being X-mirrored (x-tmfassociates.json) | WebSearch surfacing the X post, 2026-07-19 — see ANALYTIC STANCE, scorecard.md FOR-RETRO |
| 38 | 2026-07-16 | Starship Flight 13 ignition abort | 2-4 Raptor engines on Booster 20 failed to start at T-0; 20 production Starlink V3 sats undeployed, remain in storage | SpaceNews (Foust), corroborated Spaceflight Now/NASASpaceFlight, 2026-07-17 |
| 39 | 2026-07-20 (scheduled) | Starship Flight 13 re-attempt | 22:45 UTC; 2 of 4 non-igniting Raptors swapped, booster/ship re-stacked | SpaceX/Musk statement, multi-outlet corroboration, 2026-07-19 sweep — outcome unresolved as of this writing |
| 40 | 2026-07-17 | Rocket Lab Neutron AVac (2nd-stage vacuum engine) full-duration hot-fire test | ~5.5 min burn, Archimedes Test Complex, NASA Stennis Space Center — first positive Neutron hardware milestone tracked in this dossier | WebSearch (Space.com, Benzinga, Simply Wall St), 2026-07-19 sweep |
| 41 | 2026-Q1 (pub) | Rocket Lab combined Electron/Neutron backlog, count-basis | ~70 missions (31 Electron/HASTE + 5 dedicated Neutron bookings added Q1 2026) — distinct metric from the $2.2B backlog value already tracked | WebSearch (NASASpaceFlight Jul 8, re-confirmed), 2026-07-19 |
| 42 | 2026-07-02 | Amazon Leo satellite count, final Atlas V (LA-08, 29 sats) | 396 in orbit; no confirmed launch since as of this writing | WebSearch (Space.com, GeekWire, The Register), cross-checked 2026-07-19 |
| 43 | 2026-07-19 (T-11d) | Amazon Leo July 30 milestone tracking, derived | 396/1,618 required (24.5%) vs. Amazon's own Jan 30 filing projection of ~700 (21% target) by the deadline — tracking below its own optimistic projection with 11 days left | PRIMARYderived (this dossier) from FCC DA 26-553 filing figures + current count |
| 44 | 2026-03-26 (pub) | Gwynne Shotwell full-year 2026 F9 launch guidance | "maybe 140, 145-ish," down from 165 actual in 2025 — company guidance for deceleration, previously untracked here | WebSearch (Time Magazine interview), surfaced 2026-07-19 |
| 45 | 2026-07 (pub) | NASA Isaacman: New Glenn RTF drop-dead line for Artemis 3 impact | "middle of 2027," sharper than the prior "getting nervous"-line framing; NASA studying Falcon Heavy/Vulcan as Plan B alternatives | WebSearch (Benzinga), 2026-07-19 sweep |
| 46 | 2026-03-24/30 | SES/K2 Space meoSphere launch vehicle, confirmed | Falcon 9 exclusively for the March 30 pathfinder and planned operational stacks (~7 sats/fairing to LEO, self-propelled to MEO) — SES has not modeled New Glenn as a diversification option in practice, consistent with this dossier's standing advice | WebSearch (SpaceNews, Aviation Week), cross-checked 2026-07-19 |
| 47 | 2026-07-17 | NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 contract ceiling raise | $5.6B -> $17B (+$11.4B); expected 2025-2034 missions 60 -> 170 (+110) on a 5+5yr IDIQ; provider pool widened to 6 (ULA, SpaceX, Stoke Space, Rocket Lab, Impulse Space, Relativity Federal — last two added Jul 8) | WebSearch (Breaking Defense, SpaceNews "Space Force triples launch contract ceiling," Defense Daily, Air & Space Forces Mag, SatNews — 5+ outlets cross-corroborated), 2026-07-24; brief 2026-07-23 S3 |
| 48 | 2026-07-21 (SatNews) | NSSL Phase 3 total launch budget, both lanes | ~$30B ($17B Lane 1 + $13.7B Lane 2) | WebSearch (SatNews Jul 21) |
| 49 | 2026-07-20 | Falcon 9 Vandenberg post-ignition auto-abort | B1082, 24 Starlink V2 Mini (Starlink 17-39); all 9 Merlin 1D briefly ignited, flight computer commanded shutdown at T-0; no vehicle/pad/payload damage; reflew Jul 21 — 2nd SpaceX engine-related abort in a week (after Flight 13's Jul 16 abort) | brief 2026-07-21 D9 (Spaceflight Now, Space.com, Tech Times) |
| 50 | 2026-07-23/24 | Starship Flight 13 3rd slip | Jul 23 attempt scrubbed on weather -> NET Jul 24, 22:45 UTC (90-min window); NASASpaceFlight (Jul 22) reported an additional Booster 20 test required after the Jul 16 ignition abort; 20 production V3 Starlink sats still undeployed | WebSearch (Space.com live coverage, NASASpaceFlight), 2026-07-24 — outcome unresolved as of this writing |
| 51 | 2026-05-18 (disclosed) | New Glenn failure-mode clarification (per AST calls) | booster (1st stage) landed successfully on 2 of its last 3 flights incl. the failed BlueBird-7/NG3 mission — only the BE-3U upper stage has failed to date, not the reusable booster; narrows but does not reverse the 0-for-1 constellation-launch record | [INBOX] AST SpaceMobile Inc._Company Conference Presentation_2026-05-18_English.pdf; brief 2026-07-21 D7 |
| 52 | 2026-07-20 (8-K) | AST $1.0B convertible notes — closing terms | $983.6M net proceeds; 1.625% coupon due 2034; ~$79.57 initial conversion price; $149.1975 capped-call cap | EDGAR AST 8-K filed 2026-07-20 (live-verified); brief 2026-07-21 D7 |
| 53 | 2026-07-21 | AST BlueBirds 8/9/10 status; next trio | 8/9/10 confirmed operational in orbit; BlueBirds 11-13 targeted early-August launch from Cape Canaveral (was "H1 August") | brief 2026-07-21 (2111Z); WebSearch corroboration |
| 54 | 2026-07 (per AST calls) | AST per-satellite cost guidance, quiet re-basing | $19-21M -> $21-23M across five earnings calls Aug 2024-May 2026 (attributed externally to tariffs/launch costs); manufacturing pace acknowledged "somewhat behind" (Q&A, Mar 2026 call) | [INBOX] AST earnings-call transcripts; brief 2026-07-21 D-detail |
| 55 | 2026-07-24 (T-6d) | Amazon Leo July 30 milestone — outcome effectively determined | ~396 in orbit (398 launched/396 operational, 15 flights); all remaining Kuiper launches (Ariane 6/F9/New Glenn/Vulcan) NET October 2026 -> cannot reach even its own ~700 Jan-30 self-projection; crosses the Jul 30 DA 26-553 deadline at ~24.5% of the 1,618-sat 50% bar (~12.3% of the full 3,232) | WebSearch (Wikipedia "List of Amazon Leo launches," updated Jul 20; keeptrack/orbitalradar cross-check), 2026-07-24 |
| 56 | 2026-07-23 (reported) | FCC Space Bureau Chief Jay Schwarz departure | Schwarz (author of the DA 26-553 Amazon Leo milestone order and lead on the Jul 22 Part 100 licensing overhaul) leaving the FCC after 18 months; Carr says he stayed through the Part 100 adoption | X/@mdaneman (Communications Daily) via x-tmfassociates.json mirror, 2026-07-22; WebSearch corroboration (Cablefax) |
| 57 | 2026-05-11 (call, pre-explosion) | AST launch-vehicle stacking density by provider | New Glenn: up to 8 BlueBirds/fairing (ramping 3->4->6->7->8 across missions); ULA Vulcan: up to 5; Falcon 9: up to 3 | [INBOX] AST SpaceMobile Inc._Earnings Call_2026-05-11_English.md |
| 58 | 2026-05-22 | New Glenn NG3/BlueBird-7 mishap investigation, FAA-closed | root cause specified: a cryogenic leak froze a hydraulic line, causing the BE-3U 2nd-stage thrust anomaly on the 2nd burn (refines the "thrust shortfall" framing already tracked); FAA accepted Blue Origin's report and lifted the NG3-specific grounding order — mooted five days later by the separate May 28 LC-36 explosion | WebSearch (SpaceNews "Blue Origin completes investigation into New Glenn launch failure," union-bulletin.com), cross-checked 2026-07-31 |
| 59 | 2026-07-20 (pub) | SpaceX halts new commercial rideshare (Transporter/Bandwagon) bookings beyond late 2028 | cites internal prioritization of Falcon 9/Starship capacity for Starlink V3 deployment and orbital AI data centers; existing 2026-2028 manifest honored, no new SSO/mid-inclination rideshare slots sold past late 2028 | SatNews Jul 20, corroborated AIAA Jul 21, cross-verified WebSearch 2026-07-31 |
| 60 | 2026-07-24 | Starship Flight 13 outcome, confirmed | flew successfully on the 3rd attempt; deployed 20 production Starlink V3 satellites via dispenser on a SUBORBITAL, designed-to-demise trajectory (satellites briefly linked to the network then deorbited/burned up ~20min post-deploy) — a dispenser-mechanism test, not an operational orbital insertion; Booster 20 suffered a hard splashdown and was lost for reuse after only 10 of 13 engines relit for the landing burn, 5 of which then failed | SpaceNews/Spaceflight Now/Space.com (Jul 25), cross-verified WebSearch 2026-07-31; brief 2026-07-25 S1 |
| 61 | 2026-07-24 (pub) | New Glenn GS2 (BE-3U) upper-stage requalification testing relocated to NASA Stennis B-2 stand | joint NASA-Blue Origin agreement, announced same day; testing targeted to begin "this fall" (~Sep-Oct 2026); driven by LC-36's continued inability to support stage-level hotfire testing post-explosion | NASASpaceFlight, SpaceNews, NASA release Jul 24, WebSearch 2026-07-31 |
| 62 | 2026-07-29/30 | NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1, first task-order tranche drawn against the tripled ceiling | SpaceX awarded 100% (18/18 missions, $1.6bn, Vandenberg, thru end-2027) of the Space Based Sensing and Targeting (SBST) task order — zero missions to Rocket Lab/Stoke/ULA/Blue Origin/Impulse/Relativity Federal in this first tranche since the Jul 17 ceiling tripling | SpaceNews/Breaking Defense (Jul 29-30), Space Systems Command release; brief 2026-07-30 S3 |
| 63 | 2026-Q1/Q2 2026 (per Farrar) | F9 Starlink launches per quarter, deceleration | 33 (Q1 2026) -> 27 (Q2 2026), attributed in part to a slowdown in May 2026 "as SpaceX focused all efforts on the Starship test flight" | [INBOX] Starlink profile 2026-07-22.md (TMF Associates/Farrar, proprietary — paraphrased per no-redistribution restriction, not quoted verbatim) |
| 64 | 2026-07-30 | F9 launches YTD (total/Starlink), self-derived | 87 / 68 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (distinct-mission count, Jan 1-Jul 30) |
| 65 | 2026-07-30 | F9 Starlink cadence, Jan 1-Jul 30 run rate | ~9.8/month | derived: 68 missions / 6.93 months, planet4589 mirror |
| 66 | 2026 (Jan 1-Jul 30) | Dedicated rideshare (Transporter/Bandwagon) F9 missions, updated count | still 2 for the year (Mar 30, Jul 7) — no 3rd rideshare mission since Jul 7 | planet4589 mirror, self-tabulated |
| 67 | 2026-07-30 (call, primary) | SES CEO Al-Saleh on Falcon 9 retirement/Starship-transition risk | states SES has "no specifics" on SpaceX's F9-retirement plans; confirms launches are secured for C-band clearing, IRIS2's early stages, and meoSphere; frames continued access as balance-sheet-dependent ("you got to have the balance sheet to be able to get it locked up") rather than assured, and calls for non-SpaceX cadence to increase industry-wide | [INBOX] SES S.A._Earnings Call_2026-07-30T00_00_00_English.md |
| 68 | 2026-07-30 (deadline, confirmed) | Amazon Leo 50%-milestone bar, corrected figure | FCC DA 26-553 states the 50% bar is 1,616 satellites (half of the 3,232-satellite authorized total, itself reduced from an original 3,236) — corrects this dossier's own prior "1,618" figure carried in STATE OF PLAY prose and two earlier TRACKED SERIES rows (07-19, 07-24, left unedited per append-only rule); does not change the ~24.5% outcome materially | PRIMARYdocs.fcc.gov DA-26-553A1.txt (WebFetch, primary source, re-verified 2026-07-31) |
| 69 | 2026-07-27/30 (calls) | Telesat Lightspeed launch plan, first primary detail tracked in this dossier | first satellites NET end-2026 from Vandenberg via Falcon 9; heavy launch cadence through 2027; ~96 satellites needed in orbit for full global commercial service by end-2027; the full-service date itself slipped ~3 months (end-2027 -> end-Q1 2028) — attributed to SatixFy/MDA onboard-processor ASIC delivery, NOT a launch-vehicle constraint | [INBOX] Telesat Corporation_Earnings Call_2026-03-17_English.md |
| 70 | 2026-07-16 (8-K, pub) | AST SpaceMobile's own disclosure language on a launch-provider acquisition | $1bn convertible-note 8-K states remaining proceeds may fund "partnerships and/or acquisitions" to secure additional launch access and reduce third-party reliance; company states no agreement exists for any such transaction as of filing | WebSearch (24/7 Wall St, Globe and Mail/MarketBeat, Farrar quoted), cross-verified 2026-07-31 |
| 71 | 2026-07-08 (reported) | Blue Origin first-outside-investor funding round | $10B raised at $130B valuation; Coatue led ~$4B, Bezos personally committed ~$2B | WebSearch (Bloomberg, CNBC, TechCrunch, NYT DealBook, Yahoo Finance, SiliconANGLE, GuruFocus — 7-outlet convergence, all dated 2026-07-08), cross-referenced scorecard.md's 2026-07-09 retro (Gap 1: flagged as a cross-brief MISS, never captured by any daily brief; not previously in this dossier) |
| 72 | 2026-08-04 (checked) | Blue Origin $10B raise, follow-on/use-of-proceeds | no source found earmarking the raise to LC-36 recovery or New Glenn RTF acceleration specifically; no follow-on reporting in any brief 07-09 through 08-04 | briefs 2026-07-09 through 2026-08-04 (negative check); dossier run 2026-08-04 |
| 73 | 2026-06-25 (board meeting) / 2026-07-22 (accounts filed) / 2026-08-03 (reported) | MaiaSpace (ArianeGroup reusable-microlauncher subsidiary) financial distress | 2025 accounts show a €37.5M loss and shareholders' equity of -€823,375 (from +€35.82M in 2024) — a French-law mandatory continue/dissolve trigger; ArianeGroup's board (met Jun 25) declined to dissolve the subsidiary | europeanspaceflight.com (Andrew Parsonson, PROMOTED named-author outlet), published 2026-08-03T15:12Z, via brief 2026-08-04T0346Z — single-sourced as of this run, no second outlet found |
| 74 | 2026-08-04 (checked) | AST BlueBirds 11-13 launch | still NET 2026-08-05 (03:42 EDT primary/05:10 backup, Falcon 9); has not yet flown as of this run | briefs 2026-08-01 through 2026-08-04 (unmoved date, live-checked each cycle) |
| 75 | 2026-02-12 (event) / 2026-02-25 (grounded) | ULA Vulcan Centaur grounding, previously untracked in this dossier | USSF-87 mission itself succeeded, but one of four Northrop Grumman GEM 63XL solid-rocket boosters suffered a visible anomaly ~20s post-liftoff; Space Force halted further NSSL missions on Vulcan Feb 25 pending investigation; Vulcan has not flown since, investigation still open as of 2026-08-07 (~6 months) | WebSearch (SpaceNews "Space Force halts Vulcan missions pending investigation into solid rocket issue," Spaceflight Now Feb 12 launch report, DefenseScoop Mar 26 "Space Force mitigating impacts"), cross-checked 2026-08-07 |
| 76 | 2026-08-05 (disclosed) | New Glenn LC-36 explosion root cause, confirmed | Blue Origin CEO Dave Limp: main-oxygen-valve fault on one of New Glenn's 7 BE-4 first-stage engines, confirmed via hardware recovery + inspection; "small modifications to the valve...quickly retrofitted to existing engines"; updated hardware "ready by the end of this month" (Aug 2026); RTF still only "before end of year" — no date sharpening from this disclosure | Spaceflight Now (Robinson-Smith, Aug 6, citing Limp's Aug 5 social post), cross-verified WebSearch 2026-08-07 |
| 77 | 2026-08-06 (reported) | BE-4 valve fix cross-affects ULA's Vulcan | ULA confirms Blue Origin will perform the same main-oxygen-valve retrofit on Vulcan's BE-4 engines (2 per Vulcan first stage vs. New Glenn's 7; not identical hardware — Vulcan's BE-4s lack relight/landing/reuse features) at ULA's Decatur, AL plant and Cape Canaveral, layering onto Vulcan's own separate, still-unresolved Feb 12 SRB investigation; RTF still only "this year," no date set | Spaceflight Now (Robinson-Smith, Aug 6, ULA spokesperson statement), cross-verified WebSearch 2026-08-07 |
| 78 | 2026-08-07 (as of, derived) | US NSSL-certified launch-vehicle operational status | Every US NSSL-certified vehicle besides Falcon 9 is simultaneously non-operational: Vulcan grounded since Feb 2026 (unresolved SRB anomaly), New Glenn grounded since May 28 (pad non-functional); Blue Origin's own Lane 2 certification additionally requires a 4th successful New Glenn flight it cannot yet attempt — a more precise, better-sourced explanation for the Jul 29-30 SBST tranche's 100%-SpaceX outcome than a repeating "SpaceX wins most task orders" base rate | TechTimes ("No Backup: SpaceX Closes Phase 2 Spy Satellite Contract as Rival Rockets Stay Grounded," Jul 30) via WebSearch; cross-verified Reuters/WTAQ Aug 4 syndication ("SpaceX's satellite ambitions squeeze out rivals reliant on its rockets"), 2026-08-07 |
| 79 | 2026-08-05 | AST BlueBirds 11-13 (Block 2) launch, confirmed flown | Falcon 9 B1077, Cape Canaveral, liftoff 07:49 UTC; all 3 deployed successfully ~54min post-liftoff; booster landed (162nd droneship landing); deployment/checkout underway ahead of joining the constellation | brief 2026-08-05T0958Z (SpaceflightNow/Space.com); independently confirmed via sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (designator 2026-179, SpaceMobile-011/012/013) |
| 80 | 2026-08-05 | F9 launches YTD (total/Starlink), self-derived | 90 / 70 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (distinct-mission count, Jan 1-Aug 5) |
| 81 | 2026-08-05 | F9 Starlink cadence, Jan 1-Aug 5 run rate | ~9.9/month | derived: 70 missions / 7.10 months, planet4589 mirror |
| 82 | 2026 (Jan 1-Aug 5) | Dedicated rideshare (Transporter/Bandwagon) F9 missions, updated count | still 2 for the year (Mar 30, Jul 7) — no 3rd rideshare mission in the 5 weeks since Jul 7 | planet4589 mirror, self-tabulated |
| 83 | 2026-07-05 (last launch) / 2026-08-07 (checked) | Qianfan/Spacesail launch-cadence pause, independently confirmed | planet4589 mirror's last Qianfan/Spacesail batch is Group 15 (designator 2026-155), Jul 5, 2026 — no Qianfan entry Jul 6-Aug 5 despite the mirror being current through Aug 5, consistent with Chinese financial-press reporting (Sina/21jingji/ITHome, via briefs) of ~238-239 satellites against a stated 324-by-mid-2026 plan. No primary China SatNet/CASC schedule explanation found despite a dedicated Mandarin-language sweep across three briefs this week plus this run's own WebSearch | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (self-derived, Jan 1-Aug 5 tabulation); briefs 2026-08-05T0347Z, 2026-08-07T0757Z, 2026-08-07T1156Z; WebSearch, 2026-08-07 — negative check, see Open Q11 |
| 84 | 2026-08-04 (call) | Starship Flight 14, target and objective | NET "end of this month" per Musk (Q2 call)/"as early as late August" per NASASpaceFlight; will attempt to fly Starlink V3 satellites to actual operational orbit (vs. Flight 13's suborbital, designed-to-demise dispenser test), with an attempted ship catch by the tower "if we receive regulatory approval"; Ship 40 (Flight 13) survived splashdown intact, giving SpaceX its first close-up post-flight TPS data | [INBOX] Space Exploration Technologies Corp._Earnings Call_2026-08-04_English.md (Musk Q&A); NASASpaceFlight (Alcantarilla Romera/Reid/Bergin), Aug 4, WebSearch cross-check 2026-08-07 |
| 85 | 2026-08-04 (call) | SpaceX H1 2026 total launches / mass to orbit, company-disclosed | 78 total launches (all vehicles), 1,041 tons mass to orbit delivered H1 2026; Shotwell: "currently launching at our highest Falcon cadence" — in tension with Farrar's Starlink-specific Q1->Q2 deceleration (33->27, already tracked below); plausibly reconcilable if non-Starlink F9 missions rose as Starlink-dedicated missions fell, not independently verified this run | [INBOX] Space Exploration Technologies Corp._Earnings Call_2026-08-04_English.md (Shotwell prepared remarks) |
| 86 | 2026-08 (per Space Force SB-AMTI award) | Rocket Lab Neutron debut, new external deadline | Aug 4 SB-AMTI "Flatellites" task order ($397M of a $615M/3-firm tranche, see priors.md Rocket Lab thread) names Neutron as launch vehicle against a 2028 operational deadline — Neutron's own debut stays NET Q4 2026, unchanged, but now carries a named DoD delivery-schedule dependency beyond the company's own timeline | TechTimes ("Neutron Has Defense Mission Due by 2028 Before Its First Flight: RKLB Earnings Preview"), WebSearch 2026-08-07 |
| 87 | 2026 (as of Aug 5-6 reporting) | NASA Blue Moon Mark 1 lunar lander, New-Glenn-RTF-dependent slip | Endurance (1st Blue Moon Mk1) target slipped from "end of summer" 2026 to "Q1 2027," explicitly awaiting New Glenn's availability (SVP Couluris: "ready and stored in a quiescent state for when New Glenn is ready") — a second named NASA program, alongside Artemis 3's "middle of 2027" drop-dead line, now tracking New Glenn's calendar | Spaceflight Now (Robinson-Smith), Aug 6, WebSearch cross-check 2026-08-07 |
| 88 | 2026-05-26 (announced) / 2026-06-25 (pub) | SEOPS Waymaker rideshare manifest, sold out | Rideshare integrator SEOPS announced its Waymaker Falcon 9 rideshare program (first mission targeting 2028); within a month the manifest was full with ~30 customers on a waitlist — first hard quantification of how tight the marginal rideshare market is, independent of SpaceX's own late-2028 booking freeze (tracked 07-20) | SpaceNews, "Small satellite operators confront a bottleneck to space access" (pub 2026-06-25), WebSearch 2026-08-12 |
| 89 | 2026-08-10 (10-Q, filed 16:18:42Z) | Rocket Lab Q2 2026 financials and Neutron schedule language | Revenue $234.066M (+62.0% YoY); backlog $2.356bn as of Jun 30 2026 (vs. $1.847bn Dec 31 2025, +27.5%); MD&A states Stage 1 tank production is "aligned with the target delivery of Neutron to the launch pad in Q4 2026," but "the window for an end-of-year launch date is narrowing" — first primary-text Neutron schedule-risk admission tracked here | SEC EDGAR 10-Q, accession 0001819994-26-000062 (sources/latest/edgar-docs mirror); brief 2026-08-11T0355Z |
| 90 | 2026-08-11 (market reaction) | Rocket Lab (RKLB) stock reaction to the Neutron "narrowing" language | Shares fell ~7-9.6% (range across Yahoo Finance/GuruFocus/Benzinga/TradingKey) despite the record Q2 revenue/backlog print above — capital markets penalized the schedule-risk language specifically, not the underlying financials | WebSearch (Yahoo Finance, GuruFocus, Benzinga, TradingKey — 4-outlet convergence on occurrence, range on exact %), 2026-08-12 |
| 91 | 2026-08-10 (10-Q, disclosed) | Rocket Lab closed acquisitions: Mynaric AG, Motiv Space Systems | Mynaric AG (German optical inter-satellite-link maker): 100% acquired for ~$160.802M in RKLB stock, closed Apr 14 2026, "addresses a critical supply chain constraint for satellite constellation operators." Motiv Space Systems (robotics/SADAs): ~$44.539M cash+contingent, closed May 26 2026. Vertical-integration moves; full mechanics belong to dossiers/industry-consolidation.md | SEC EDGAR 10-Q, accession 0001819994-26-000062, Business Combinations note; brief 2026-08-11T0355Z |
| 92 | 2026-08-11 (earnings, filed same day) | Firefly Aerospace (FLY) Q2 2026 results — first tracked in this dossier | Revenue $117.7M (+659% YoY), backlog ~$1.5bn; 2026 Alpha launch count cut from 4 to 3; medium-lift Eclipse's Miranda engine completed 150 hot-fires incl. a 226-second flight-like duty-cycle test, first flight still NET 2027, unchanged — a fifth non-SpaceX vehicle confirming the capacity-constrained pattern | PRIMARY8-K filed 2026-08-11 (accession 0001860160-26-000022, EDGAR full-text-search-confirmed, primary body not mirrored); WebSearch (Investing.com/Seeking Alpha, TradingView, MarketBeat), brief 2026-08-12T0350Z |
| 93 | 2026-08-10 (event) | Long March 7A launch failure — ChinaSat-4B lost | Exploded ~83-85s after liftoff from Wenchang, ~12:00-12:02 UTC; China's 4th orbital launch failure of 2026; YF-100 engine (spans LM-5/6/6A/6C/7/7A/8/8A/10/12) placed under mandatory investigation; LM-7A grounded pending inquiry; unconfirmed whether Qianfan/Guowang's own LM-6A/LM-8 workhorses are swept in | SpaceNews, china-in-space.com, Space.com, TechTimes (2026-08-10); brief 2026-08-11T0355Z |
| 94 | 2026-08-12 (checked) | YF-100 investigation scope vs. Qianfan/Guowang cadence | No confirmation either way (as of this run) whether LM-6A/LM-8 are included in the grounding; no Guowang/Qianfan launch or cadence change reported since the Aug 10 failure | briefs 2026-08-11T0355Z, 2026-08-12T0350Z, 2026-08-12T1314Z (negative check); dedicated Mandarin WebSearch sweep, 2026-08-12 |
| 95 | 2026-08-12 (self-derived) | F9 launches YTD (total/Starlink) | 93 / 73 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (distinct-mission count, Jan 1-Aug 12) |
| 96 | 2026-08-12 (self-derived) | F9 Starlink cadence, Jan 1-Aug 12 run rate | ~9.96/month | derived: 73 missions / 7.33 months, planet4589 mirror |
| 97 | 2026 (Jan 1-Aug 12) | Dedicated rideshare (Transporter/Bandwagon) F9 missions, updated count | still 2 for the year (Mar 30, Jul 7) — no 3rd rideshare mission in the 5+ weeks since Jul 7 | planet4589 mirror, self-tabulated |
| 98 | 2026-08-10 (call, primary) | AST SpaceMobile Q2 2026 call — launch-provider mix and New Glenn stance | CSO Wisniewski, in response to a direct analyst question: "We have 10 launches booked with 2 different providers, and we're targeting a cadence of every month or 2 on average... we're not betting on [New Glenn] necessarily... with a mix of launches, we think we can get to early 2027 for our initial 45 satellites" | [INBOX] AST SpaceMobile, Inc._Earnings Call_2026-08-10T00_00_00_English.md |
| 99 | 2026-08 (NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 structural detail) | Rocket Lab / Stoke Space task-order eligibility gate | Both firms are contractually on-ramped to the widened six-provider Lane 1 pool but cannot compete for a single task order until each completes its own first successful launch — neither has flown Neutron or Stoke's Nova as of this run | WebSearch (GovConWire "Space Force Adds 2 Launch Providers to NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 Contract"), 2026-08-12 |
| 100 | 2026-08-10 (pub) | Tim Farrar (tmfassociates.com) disputes Musk's "1+ Starship flight/day" target | Argues terminal-manufacturing capacity (Bastrop scaling to ~300K terminals/week by year-end, implying ~2M net adds/quarter) and addressable demand (Shotwell's 15-20K-satellite guidance vs. ~110K implied by Musk's cadence math, which would require ~1bn global fixed-broadband customers) — not launch cadence — are Starlink's real binding constraints; concludes many future Starship flights "will need to be devoted to Starlink Mobile" rather than daily broadband-fleet cadence | tmfassociates.com, "Musk's daily Starship problem…" (2026-08-10T17:47Z); brief 2026-08-11T0355Z |
| 101 | 2026-08-10 (call, primary) | Rocket Lab CEO Peter Beck on the launch-supply crunch | "I've personally never seen launch so constrained in pretty much ever... I don't see [it] changing any time soon either. Because even as new capacity comes on market from some competitors, a lot of that capacity is already spoken for, for their own internal programs... whether it be Internet or AI data centers." Also: Rocket Lab is deliberately withholding Neutron capacity pre-flight for its own Iridium/applications needs rather than selling it all externally | [INBOX] Rocket Lab Corporation_Earnings Call_2026-08-10T00_00_00_English.md |
| 102 | 2026-08-11 (call, primary) | Firefly Aerospace CEO Jason Kim on the launch-supply crunch | "This is the most constrained you see in launch... We've never seen the launch capacity so constrained... The demand is not the problem. The backlog is not the problem. It's really ramping up production" — Alpha ASPs guided up specifically because of the constrained environment; majority of 2027 manifest already sold out | [INBOX] Firefly Aerospace Inc._Earnings Call_2026-08-11T00_00_00_English.md |
| 103 | 2026-08-11 (call, primary) | Firefly Aerospace 2026 Alpha cadence, second cut | 2026 Alpha flights cut a second time, 3→2 (was 4 originally, cut to 3 as of the Aug 11 8-K); ~$435M 2026 revenue guide, ~90% from spacecraft not launch; new Wallops (VA) pad NET 2027, Sweden (SSC) pad NET 2028 to add cadence capacity | [INBOX] Firefly Aerospace Inc._Earnings Call_2026-08-11T00_00_00_English.md; Space Intel Report/@pbdes 2026-08-13T16:22Z (de Selding), brief 2026-08-14T0828Z |
| 104 | 2026-08-13 (call, primary) | Telesat CEO Daniel Goldberg on Lightspeed's Falcon 9 dependence | "To launch the 225 satellites, we estimate we need 15 rockets. We already have 14 under contract with SpaceX... we've been in touch with our friends at SpaceX. They've agreed to make that rocket available to us" — first confirmed dedicated F9 sale to a rival Western constellation inside SpaceX's post-late-2028 rideshare-freeze window; commits to all 225 satellites launched by end-2028, names no non-SpaceX alternative | [INBOX] Telesat Corporation_Earnings Call_2026-08-13T00_00_00_English.md |
| 105 | 2026-08-13/14 (named byline, primary-adjacent) | LM-7A/ChinaSat-4B investigation scope, resolved | china-in-space.com (Jack C.): the Aug 10 failure is being worked as a 3rd-stage structural fault (quality-control mishap and/or harsh winds), NOT a YF-100 engine fault; a successful LM-7A return-to-flight "would further clear" LM-6, LM-6A, LM-6C, LM-8, LM-8A, LM-5, LM-5B — Guowang/Qianfan's own LM-6A/LM-8 workhorses were never swept in; resolves [former open question #13](#superseded) | china-in-space.com, "Guowang Strides Into Orbit Again" and related coverage, 2026-08-13T11:35Z; brief 2026-08-14T0828Z |
| 106 | 2026-08-16 (launch) | Guowang Group 24, cadence acceleration | 9 satellites, Long March 12 (YF-100K), Wenchang Pad 2 — only 12 days after Group 23 (Aug 4), vs. the prior ~48-day Group 22→23 gap; china-in-space.com's own post-launch cumulative count is 195 (below priors.md's prior 216/211 baseline, a standing cross-tracker discrepancy, not resolved here); operator states Wenchang Pad 2 has sustained monthly-or-faster cadence for 3 consecutive months | china-in-space.com (Jack C.), 2026-08-16T06:54:39Z, corroborated Xinhua/CGTN/state media and @planet4589; brief 2026-08-17T0343Z |
| 107 | 2026-08-17 (announced) | SEOPS adds a second dedicated Waymaker rideshare mission | Original mission (now Waymaker-2, SSO, late 2028) hit "90-plus percent sold out" per SEOPS president Evan Hoyt within ~3 months of its May 26 launch; new Waymaker-1 (mid-inclination LEO, early 2028) repurposes the Darkstar-1 GTO slot. Hoyt on the freeze: SpaceX "not taking orders for its Transporter programs after late 2028 or early 2029," calling rideshare an already "crunched industry" | PRIMARYSpaceNews/Payload Space, 2026-08-17 (WebSearch, primary-sourced exec quotes) |
| 108 | 2026-08-12 (announced) | Blue Origin second Cape Canaveral pad, LC-36B | Targets late 2027; designed for the larger New Glenn 9x4 variant, independent VIF from the existing LC-36A pad still under RTF repair; capital continuing to flow into New Glenn capacity expansion ahead of RTF | SpaceNews/NASASpaceFlight/AIAA, 2026-08-12-14 (WebSearch) |
| 109 | 2026-06-01 (announced) / 2026-08-18 (corrected here) | NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 provider count, corrected | The Lane 1 pool is 7 providers, not 6 as this dossier tracked 07-24: Blue Origin has been on-ramped since the original 2024 award (with SpaceX/ULA), not newly added by the Jul 17 widening, and won its own task order (NTO-4, one NRO mission, Q4CY27-Q1CY28 delivery) before the ceiling tripling — see [SUPERSEDED](#superseded) | ExecutiveGov, GovConWire (WebSearch, 2026-08-18); corrects this dossier's own 2026-07-17 row above |
| 110 | 2026-08-16 (pub) | AST SpaceMobile launch-manifest update, corroborating the Aug 10 call | SpaceNews (Foust): AST needs 9 more launches to complete the 45-satellite Block 2 constellation; President Wisniewski names Vulcan as an active hedge under consideration for the first time (vs. Falcon 9/New Glenn only previously); AST can fit 5 BlueBirds per Vulcan launch | SpaceNews (Foust), 2026-08-16T23:05Z (WebSearch); brief 2026-08-17T0343Z |
| 111 | 2026-08-18 (self-derived) | F9 launches YTD (total/Starlink) | 96 / 73 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (distinct-mission count, Jan 1-Aug 18) |
| 112 | 2026-08-18 (self-derived) | F9 Starlink cadence, Jan 1-Aug 18 run rate | ~9.66/month | derived: 73 missions / 7.56 months, planet4589 mirror |
| 113 | 2026 (Jan 1-Aug 18) | Dedicated rideshare (Transporter/Bandwagon) F9 missions, updated count | still 2 for the year (Mar 30, Jul 7); Qianfan/Spacesail shows no launch since Jul 5 in the mirror through Aug 18 — pause now 6+ weeks, [still unexplained](#open-questions) | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (self-derived, Jan 1-Aug 18 tabulation) |
| 114 | 2026-08-18 (checked) | New Glenn/Vulcan RTF status, unmoved | Neither vehicle has flown since grounding (New Glenn since May 28, Vulcan since Feb 25); no RTF date sharper than "before end of year" for either as of this run, unchanged since Aug 7 | WebSearch (Spaceflight Now, SpaceNews, WFTV), 2026-08-18 — negative check |
| 115 | 2026-06 (proto-qual) / 2026-07 (pad activation) | Stoke Space Nova, testing status | Stage-1 proto-qualification testing complete (Jun 2026, Moses Lake WA); LC-14 Cape Canaveral activated for operations (Jul 2026); first flight NET "later 2026," expendable, to heliocentric orbit as the inaugural mission | Stoke Space (stokespace.com), NASASpaceFlight, WebSearch 2026-08-18 |
| 116 | 2026-08-18 (booster landing) / 2026-08-22/23 (damage revealed) | LandSpace Zhuque-3 Y2 land-based booster recovery — China's first land-based leg recovery of an orbital-class booster, first-ever Chinese private-sector booster recovery | 1st stage soft-landed on deployable legs, dedicated pad, Minqin County, Gansu, following Long March 10B's Jul 10 sea-net-capture recovery; deployed Hongqing Technology's "Honghu-03" tech-demonstrator; LandSpace stated a 6-month reflight target — but the landed booster toppled and was damaged within hours (propellant-vent fire, holed lower tank, 2 deformed TQ-12A nozzles, grid-fin/inter-stage damage), confirmed by a 2nd independent outlet after an initial single-source report | [SECONDARY, multi-outlet] Xinhua/People's Daily/china-in-space.com/Space.com via brief 2026-08-19T0343Z (landing); china-in-space.com (weak signal) via brief 2026-08-23T0342Z, corroborated NASASpaceFlight via brief 2026-08-24T0340Z (damage) |
| 117 | 2026-08-11 (ESA CM25, retroactive) / 2026-08-20 (confirmed on record) | Ariane 6 Block 3 evolution (incl. ICARUS lightweight upper stage) shelved | ESA on-record statement: "No evolution of the ULPM [ICARUS] was approved at CM25, as no programme need was identified for such an evolution at this stage. Consequently, no development activities are currently underway."; near-term roadmap now limited to already-introduced P160C boosters + a lighter Vulcain Aft Bay, then the Astris orbital transfer vehicle NET ~2029; member states committed €145.94M of a requested €304.4M Ariane 6 adaptations envelope at the Nov 2025 Ministerial Council (52% shortfall), same meeting the evolution was shelved | europeanspaceflight.com (Andrew Parsonson), "ESA Confirms Ariane 6 Block 3 Upgrades Have Been Shelved," pub 2026-08-20T14:58:48Z (sources/latest/europeanspaceflight.rss); priors.md dates ESA's underlying confirmation to ~Aug 11, per an earlier SpaceScout report of the same CM25 decision |
| 118 | 2026-08-20 | Portal Space Systems dedicated Falcon 9 buy, resold as rideshare | bought its own dedicated F9 for its Supernova spacecraft, will resell excess capacity as rideshare — 2nd instance (after SEOPS) of a customer routing around the Transporter/Bandwagon freeze via a dedicated buy | SpaceNews, 2026-08-20, via brief 2026-08-21T0333Z |
| 119 | 2026-08-24 (White House) | US National Space Transportation Policy — launch-cadence goal | sets a national goal of 1,000 orbital launches/year by 2030 (vs. ~200 in 2025); directs the Pentagon to plan additional launch-range facilities for a ~5x rise in demand; aspirational/directive, no appropriated funding disclosed | Air & Space Forces Magazine, SpaceWatch.Global, 2026-08-24, via brief 2026-08-25T0333Z |
| 120 | 2026-08-19 (last F9 Starlink at the Cape) / 2026-08-25 (announced) | SpaceX confirms Cape Canaveral Starlink launches transition from Falcon 9 to Starship, timed with a $100bn "Starbase Louisiana" megasite announcement | SpaceX VP Launch Ops Kiko Dontchev: the Aug 19 F9 Starlink launch from Cape Canaveral SLC-40 was the last Florida Starlink mission flown on Falcon 9 — all future Florida Starlink launches move to Starship, ending a run of ~260 F9 Starlink missions from the Cape since May 2019; same-day, SpaceX + Louisiana Gov. Landry announced a $100bn Starbase Louisiana site (Vermilion Parish, construction starts 2027, first launch NET 2029, 12+ towers targeting 30 Starship flights/day at full build-out) — the largest capital investment in Louisiana history | PRIMARY[SECONDARY, 6+ outlets] CNBC, Space.com, USNews, Fox8, KSLA, mynews13, Investing.com, via brief 2026-08-25T2152Z; no SpaceX/Governor's-office primary release text recovered as of this pass |
| 121 | 2026-08-25 (self-derived) | F9 launches YTD (total/Starlink) | 99 / 76 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (distinct-mission count, Jan 1-Aug 25; a boundary re-derivation against this dossier's own Aug 18 row found the Starlink figure matches exactly but the F9-total figure reconciles to 95, not 96, at that same cutoff — a 1-mission parsing-edge discrepancy flagged for the next pass to resolve by hand, not treated as a correction here) |
| 122 | 2026-08-25 (self-derived) | F9 Starlink cadence, Jan 1-Aug 25 run rate | ~9.76/month | derived: 76 missions / 7.787 months, planet4589 mirror — a mild uptick from Aug 18's ~9.66/month, not a continuation of the Jul-Aug deceleration |
| 123 | 2026 (Jan 1-Aug 25) | Dedicated rideshare (Transporter/Bandwagon) F9 missions, updated count | still 2 for the year (Mar 30, Jul 7) — no 3rd rideshare mission in 7+ weeks since Jul 7 | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html (self-derived, Jan 1-Aug 25 tabulation) |
| 124 | 2026-08-25 (checked) | Qianfan/Spacesail launch-cadence pause, still unresolved | last launch remains designator 2026-155 (Jul 5); mirror's raw cumulative Qianfan-tagged count is 244 vs. the ~238-239 this dossier already carries from press reporting — a small, already-known cross-tracker discrepancy, not a new finding; still no primary CASC/China SatNet explanation found | sources/latest/planet4589-launchlog.html, self-derived, Jan 1-Aug 25 tabulation |
| 125 | 2026-08-25 (checked) | New Glenn/Vulcan/Neutron/Firefly/Stoke status, unmoved | no schedule, RTF-date, or status change found for any of the five non-SpaceX vehicles this dossier tracks, across all 10 briefs published 2026-08-19 through 2026-08-25 | briefs 2026-08-19T0343Z through 2026-08-25T2152Z (negative check, this pass) |
| 126 | 2026-08-26 (checked) | New Glenn/Vulcan/Neutron/Firefly/Stoke/Ariane 6/LandSpace/Starship status, unmoved | no schedule, RTF-date, or status change found for any tracked vehicle across the four briefs published since this dossier's 08-25 update; Kepler Communications' optical-relay network going fully commercial (Aug 24) is SES-competitor-relevant but sits in [the spacex-financial-architecture dossier's scope](dossiers/spacex-financial-architecture), not this one's launch-supply axis | briefs 2026-08-25T1836Z through 2026-08-26T1618Z (negative check, this pass) |
Earlier claims that evidence disproved — kept on record. 5 corrections documented.
Believed 2026-07-05 through 2026-07-07: this dossier logged AST's April 19 New Glenn flight (NG3/SM007) simply as "first AST BlueBird on New Glenn," in both STATE OF PLAY prose and a TRACKED SERIES row, without noting mission outcome — a framing that read as a proof point for New Glenn's fairing-volume viability. Overturned 2026-07-13: the flight failed. New Glenn's second stage underperformed on its second burn (BE-3U thrust shortfall, per SatNews/Aviation Week), leaving BlueBird 7 in an orbit too low to operate; the satellite is being de-orbited and AST has filed an insurance claim (AST businesswire PR, Apr 19; FAA "mishap" declaration grounded New Glenn from that date, five weeks before the separate May 28 LC-36 explosion). New Glenn's only 2026 flight for a constellation customer tracked in this dossier was a failure, not a success — corrected in STATE OF PLAY and STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS this update.
Believed 2026-07-07: New Glenn's LC-36 pad was "destroyed" in an explosion "around June 1." Overturned 2026-07-13 on a primary/near- primary source (Spaceflight Now, citing Blue Origin CEO Dave Limp): the explosion occurred May 28 during a hotfire test, not "around June 1," and while the vehicle was destroyed and the lightning tower/ transporter-erector lost, the tank farm and water tower sustained only limited damage and the launch table is being refurbished, not rebuilt — narrower physical damage than "the pad was destroyed" implied. Does not change the grounding conclusion or the return-to-flight uncertainty.
Believed 2026-07-13: this dossier's STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS and THESIS characterized AST's F9-only pivot as a low-cost workaround — "the cost is more F9 launches per satellite deployed... an additional cadence-axis draw, not a separate blocker" — implying the fairing-volume constraint was substitutable at effectively no schedule cost once AST accepted lower per-launch density. Overturned 2026-07-19: AST SpaceMobile's own July 15 SEC filing (8-K, corroborated by SpaceNews/Via Satellite/ LightReading/SatNews quoting it directly, plus CSO Scott Wisniewski's June 2 conference remarks) discloses a 3-6 month delay to initial commercial D2D service, attributed explicitly to Blue Origin New Glenn's Apr 19 and May 28 failures — even though the F9 pivot itself (BlueBirds 8-10 flown on schedule, 11-13 still targeted H1 August) is executing as planned. The correct read: fairing-volume substitution via F9 avoided an absolute block on satellite deployment, but did not avoid a material, now SEC-quantified schedule cost to commercial service — the 07-13 framing understated the cost by describing it only in cadence-axis terms (more launches needed) rather than the calendar-time terms AST's own filing uses (months of delay). Corrected in THESIS and STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS this update.
Believed 2026-07-17 through 2026-08-12 (three passes): this dossier's TRACKED SERIES and STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS stated the NSSL Phase 3 Lane 1 provider pool was widened to six on Jul 17 (ULA, SpaceX, Stoke Space, Rocket Lab, Impulse Space, Relativity Federal), and framed the Jul 29-30 SBST tranche's 100%-SpaceX outcome as the pool's first real test. Overturned 2026-08-18 (ExecutiveGov, GovConWire, WebSearch): Blue Origin has been on-ramped to Lane 1 since the original 2024 IDIQ award alongside SpaceX and ULA — never newly added by the Jul 17 widening — and won its own task order (NRO NTO-4, one mission, Q4CY27-Q1CY28 delivery) on Jun 1, 2026, before the ceiling tripling. The pool is seven providers, not six; the SBST tranche's 100%-SpaceX outcome was still real (Blue Origin's June award predates and is separate from it), but this dossier's own provider count and "half the pool can't yet bid" framing were incomplete for three consecutive passes. Corrected in TRACKED SERIES, STATE OF PLAY, and STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS this update.
Believed 2026-07-19 through 2026-08-12 (per Open Question #13 and the STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS bullet "China's own launch reliability is cracking too"): this dossier treated the Aug 10 LM-7A/ChinaSat-4B failure's YF-100 engine investigation as a live threat to Guowang/Qianfan's own LM-6A/LM-8 workhorse vehicles, i.e. a second crack in the non-SpaceX launch-supply picture alongside the US vehicles' groundings. Overturned 2026-08-13/14 (china-in-space.com, named byline, corroborated by state media): the failure is scoped to a third-stage structural fault specific to LM-7A, not the shared YF-100 engine family — LM-6/6A/6C/7/8/8A/5/5B all clear once LM-7A itself returns to flight, and Guowang's own Aug 16 launch (12 days after the prior group, a cadence acceleration) is a real-world proof point the clearing holds. Chinese launch reliability is not, on this evidence, a second axis of non-SpaceX supply constraint. Corrected in STATE OF PLAY and STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS this update; former Open Question #13 resolved and removed from the numbered list.